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INFRINGEMENT OF COMPILATION COPYRIGHT
AFTER FEIST
John A. Odozynski*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Because a long and venerable line of federal court precedent had
held that telephone and other kinds of directories comprise subject
matter that qualifies for copyright,1 the Supreme Court's decision to
grant Feist Publications' petition for writ of certiorari 2 in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 3 was generally unexpected. In part because the Court's decision on the merits was perceived as capable of having a profound effect on the burgeoning
information services industry, but also because Rural's particularly pedestrian telephone directory did not appear to be a worthy vehicle to
test the copyrightability of the works that form the foundation of that
industry, at least some observers of the Feist litigation hoped that the
Court would confine the effect of its decision-making to telephone directories.' It is clear that the Court has not done so, but has elected to
*

Senior Intellectual Property Attorney, GTE Telephone Operations; B.S., Cornell University, 1969; J.D., State University of New York (Buffalo), 1980.
I. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (white
pages); Konor Enterprises, Inc. v. Eagle Publications, Inc., 878 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1989); United
Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (white pages); Hutchinson Tel.
Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 801 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Schroeder v. William
Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977); Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F.83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); Farmers Independent Tel. Co.
v. Thorman, 648 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. Wis. 1986); Central Tel. Company of Virginia v. Johnson
Publishing Co., 526 F. Supp. 838 (D. Colo. 1981); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minnesota, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299 (D. Minn. 1980).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991). The Court agreed to decide only Question 3: "Does
the copyright in a telephone directory by the telephone company prevent access to that directory
as a source of names and numbers to compile a competing directory, or does copyright protection
extend only to the selection, coordination, or arrangement of those numbers?" Id.
3. 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987), affdmem., 916 F.2d 718, cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 40
(1990).
4. See generally Brief of the Information Industry Association and ADAPSO as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct.
1282 (No. 89-1909) (1991) (arguing inter alia that the distinctive characteristics of white page
directories make Feist an inappropriate case for the delineation of sweeping rules on compilation
copyright). The Court did not circumscribe the effect of its decision making, but rather rendered a
decision that affects all compilations of fact. Moreover, the Court did not restrict itself to construing the Copyright Act, but decided that "[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only
those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity."
Feist, Ill S. Ct. at 1297 (emphasis added).
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speak broadly regarding the standards for copyrightability of all factual compilations.'
The Court has articulated a standard of copyrightability for compilations that eliminates "sweat of the brow" as a supporting rationale
and that imposes as a prerequisite a "modicum of creativity" in the
selection, coordination, or arrangement of the compilation. However, in
doing so, the Court has, in the words of a songwriter, "left us workin'
on mysteries without any clues." 6 That is, Feist does not reveal much
that would assist an evaluation of a compilation in order to assess, either qualitatively or quantitatively, whether its creative content passes
copyright muster. It is submitted, therefore, that it is appropriate to
take the Court at its word and require only some "minimal degree of
creativity."' 7 As long as the "selection and arrangement of facts [are
not] . . .so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever, ' 8 copyright should obtain. If this standard of originality evolves
as the ultimate import of Feist, then relatively little change will be
worked in copyrightability determinations involving compilations, and,
in fact, "[tlhe vast majority of works make the grade quite easily." 9
Somewhat unexpectedly, however, Feist may prove to have a more
significant effect on the methodology for determining copyright infringement. In cases arising prior to Feist, it is possible to perceive a
binary approach among the federal courts to copyright infringement
determinations. Courts embracing sweat of the brow were prone to en-

For its part, the Eleventh Circuit apprehends an even more extensive sweep of Feist. The
Eleventh Circuit believes that Feist mandates a detour, from traditional copyright analysis that
focuses on a copyright owner's ability to protect his own creations, to a "regulatory perspective" in
which constitutional concerns are harmonized by arriving at a balance between the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Serv. of Am.,
Inc., 940 F.2d 1471 (1lth Cir. 1991).
5. Specifically, "[a] factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original
selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or arrangement." Feist, Ill S. Ct. at 1290. In addition, the Court defined "original" as meaning "only
and that it possesses at least some
that the work was independently created by the author.
minimal degree of creativity. Id. at 1287.
6. BOB SEGER, Night Moves, on NIGHT MOVES (Capital Records 1976). While disclaiming
any intimation regarding Justice O'Connor's preferences for things country and western, one wonders whether she would be inclined to respond:
Now you've got questions I don't care to answer
And I don't get off on leading people on
It's safe to say I'm no second-chancer
And the chances are I don't know right from wrong
You could never change my mind, and I won't change my ways
And from the start the lines have all been drawn.
CLINT BLACK, I'll Be Gone, on KILLING TIME (RCA Records 1990).
7. Feist, III S. Ct. at 1287.
8. Id. at 1296.
9. Id. at 1287.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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gage in perfunctory, if any, copyrightability analysis, and, having found
the plaintiff's work to be copyrightable, had little difficulty finding infringement in an accused work.1" Conversely, courts that regarded free
dissemination of factual information as the policy consideration of primacy tended to disregard sweat and to require verbatim copying as a
condition of infringement. 1 More recently, the practice of characterizing the copyright in factual or utilitarian works as "thin" has ramified
into the conclusion, by some, that the nature of the work itself effectively determines the scope of copyright afforded to it. 1 2 For "thin"
works, it is argued, protection exists only for the precise, literal expression the work embodies.
What was always required, and remains so after Feist, was a determination of the aspects of the work that give rise to copyright and
an examination of the accused work to determine whether it could be
said to manifest substantial similarity to those aspects. The application
of Feist to these determinations should materially re-orient the outcomes, although not all copyright infringement litigations after Feist
have borne this out.
Furthermore, evolution of compilation copyright infringement
analysis in cases after Feist promises to place heightened reliance on,
and impart a modified connotation to, concepts involving the idea/expression, fact/expression, or function/expression dichotomies. However,
compilation copyright decisions will address these concepts only to the
extent that courts disengage from a "binary" approach and assume the
admittedly difficult burdens of determining copyright scope and evaluating substantial similarity. Nevertheless, the ability of courts to identify with respect to any copyright work the demarcations required by
the various dichotomies is problematic. To do so with respect to works
of compilation may approach the imponderable.'"

10. See Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.
1942); Leon v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
11. See Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 977 (1988); New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J.
1977).
12. See Bartz and Band, Feist v. Rural Telephone: The Beginning of the End of Software
Overprotection?, 7 COMPUTER LAW 10 (1991). The authors of this article argue that Feist's "persuasive endorsement of the concept of 'thin' protection for certain types of works surely undercuts
the Whelan court's apparent assumption that all literary works must receive protection for structure and organization." Id. at 12.
13. However, compilation copyright infringement jurisprudence after Feist may have experienced unanticipated assistance in the effort to separate protectible expression from fact, idea, or
function. The Eleventh Circuit, at least, appears confident that "in the case of compilations, the
protected expression is the manner of selection, coordination, or arrangement of the information
that constitutes the originality." Bellsouth Advertising v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, 933 F.2d 952,
957 (11th
Cir. 1991). 1991
Published
by eCommons,
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Once caught up in the analytical process of identifying copyrightable subject matter, the courts' confrontation with and involvement in
Idea/Expression Merger analysis seems unavoidable. Kregos v. The
Associated Press14 provides an example of the manner in which courts
struggle to determine the "idea" of a compilation, even though the associated expression may be self-evident. In an almost subliminal way,
Feist's requirement of creativity plays a part in the application of the
Idea/Expression Merger concepts to copyrightability and copyright infringement determinations. Furthermore, it is apparent that the courts
are in uncharted waters in their efforts to arrive at these determinations, and neither the parties nor relevant law provides much in the
way of meaningful guidance.
Accordingly, the dominant thrust of this paper is to examine the
manner in which copyright infringement is, or should be, determined in
the context of works of compilation. Particular attention will be paid to
copyright infringement litigations decided after Feist in order to discern the effect Feist has had, or may be expected to have, in this area
of compilation copyright law. Nevertheless, because it is impossible to
meaningfully discuss copyright infringement without reference to the
copyrightability of the work claimed to be infringed, section II of this
article will briefly treat the topic of copyrightability and, in the process,
examine whether the copyrightability standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Feist has been appropriately applied in a small sample
of post-Feist cases.
Section III will dispose of the fundamental elements of copyright
infringement, including, in subsection A, scope of copyright protection,
in subsection B, Idea/Expression Merger analysis, and, in subsection
C, substantial similarity. Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper,
the analysis of copyright infringement has been decomposed into (i) a
determination of the scope of protection properly attributable to the
copyright in question and (ii) an evaluation of substantial similarity.
Once the subject matter protected by the copyright in question has
been determined, the accused work is evaluated to determine whether it
is substantially similar to the protected subject matter. 15 In fact, a determination of the scope of a copyright will be found to almost necessarily implicate Idea/Expression Merger considerations, often eliding the
scope of protection.

14. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
15. For an attempt to apply a similar analytical methodology to copyright infringement of
computer software, see David Nimmer et al., Analyzing Substantial Similarity in Computer
Software Cases, THE COMPUTER LAWYER 17 (1989). It is fair to say that this approach is something of an analytical conceit, rarely adopted in its totality by courts deciding questions of copyhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
right infringement.
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II.
A.

COPYRIGHTABILITY: THE STANDARD

OF "ORIGINALITY"

The Feist v. Rural Standard of Originality

At stake in Feist was the copyrightability of white pages listings in
telephone directories. In spite of an extensive, and nearly uninterrupted, line of precedent upholding the copyrightability of white pages
directories, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the names,
towns, and telephone numbers compiled in white pages directories such
as Rural's are not protected by copyright. Therefore, Feist, an independent directory publisher, did not engage in copyright infringement
when it identically reproduced in its own directory, without Rural's
consent, 1309 of Rural's 7700 listings.
The Court recognized that for any work to be copyrightable, the
work must be original to the author; that is, it must have been created
by the author. In addition, in order to qualify for copyright protection,
an original work must emanate a modicum of creativity. The requirements of originality and minimal creativity are applicable to all copyrightable works.
The Court viewed Rural's white page listings as essentially a compilation of preexisting factual material, i.e., the names, towns, and telephone numbers of Rural's subscribers. An analysis of the copyrightability of Rural's telephone directory, or any other compilation of data,
implicates two well-established but competing propositions of copyright
law. Facts, per se, are not copyrightable; however, compilations of facts
generally are.
According to the Court, the statutory definition of "compilation," 1 6 found at section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976, necessarily
implies that not all compilations are copyrightable. In order to qualify
for copyrightability, the compilation in question must exhibit creativity
in the manner in which its constituent elements are selected, coordinated, or arranged. Effort or expense incurred by the compiler in creating his compilation are, the Court announced, irrelevant to a determination of the copyrightability of the compilation. In this regard, the
Court criticized precedent that did not require creativity in the selection, coordination, or arrangement of fact-based compilations. Lower
courts had misapplied the copyright statute when they supported
copyrightability based on the effort or expense expended by the compiler. In the view of the Supreme Court, the Copyright Act of 1976

16. A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting material or of data that are selected, coordinated or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term "compilation" includes collective
works.by17eCommons,
U.S.C. § 1011991
Published
(1988) (definition of "compilation").
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was in part intended to correct such error. In sum, sweat of the brow
and "industrious collection" were summarily discarded as rationales
supporting copyrightability of fact-based works.
In its search for creative arrangement in Rural's directory, the
Court was underwhelmed by the alphabetical listing of names, and associated towns and telephone numbers. The Court similarly found little
creativity in the manner in which data was selected for inclusion in the
directory. Rural's selection of basic information-names, towns, and
telephone numbers-was considered obvious. Furthermore, because the
Kansas Corporation Commission required Rural to publish this data,
the Court noted that one might plausibly conclude that Rural had not
in fact engaged in "selection" at all. At bottom, the Court observed
that section 101 clearly contemplates that some compilations of fact
necessarily fail to pass copyright muster. Because Rural's directory was
effectively devoid of any creative content, it clearly was relegated to the
class of uncopyrightable compilations.
Although the Supreme Court in Feist established creativity as a
constitutional prerequisite to copyright, the Court did not attempt to
definitively characterize the creativity required. However, the Court's
opinion is replete with indicia that the creativity required to support
copyright should not be particularly difficult to supply.
The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright
protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as the term is
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess
some creative spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious" it might
be. Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even
though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. .......

• . . [O]riginality is not a stringent standard; it does not require
that facts be presented in an innovative or surprising way. It is equally
true, however, that the selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so
mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever. The standard of originality is low, but it does exist. 8'

17. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1287 (interim ed.
1991). (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
18. Id. at 1296 (citation omitted).

1992]

INFRINGEMENT OF COMPILATION

. ..As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. 9
Accordingly, although Feist imposes an element of creativity that
not all observers perceived to have previously obtained, it is clear that
this threshold2" requirement for copyrightability was not intended by
the Court to pose a significant impediment. The remainder of this section will examine briefly the copyrightability that Feist requires in the
context of two copyright infringement cases reported after Feist.
B.

Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc.

Because of the mundane nature of Rural's telephone directory, the
Supreme Court in Feist was not required to ponder a number of the
subtler aspects of the originality requirement. Neither the "idea" nor
the "expression"21 of Rural's telephone directory was minimally creative. Therefore, left unresolved is the manner in which Feist would apply to a compilation of data, the selection, coordination, or arrangement of which is conceptually creative, but entirely routine in its
implementation. Such a circumstance is suggested by Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc.2"
Among the works in question in Lalli was the "3-5-7 Old Way"
racing chart ("the Chart") that is used for numbers betting in New
York City. The Chart is derived from reports published in local newspapers of the total sums of money bet each day on all the horse races at
a specific New York race track.
According to the Second Circuit, the Chart comprised data generated according to the following "algorithm":
[Tihe compiler of [the Chart] must add together the amounts paid by
the track on two dollar bets to win, place and show for each of the first
seven races of the day. The last digit of the total of such sums paid out
by the track in the first three races forms the first digit of the lucky
number; the last digit of the total paid out by the track in the first five
races forms the second digit of the lucky number; the final digit of the
lucky number is the last digit of the total for all seven races."

19. Id. at 1297.
20. As will be seen in the discussion at infra notes 82-153, originality is but one component
of a determination of copyrightability, which may also be deemed to include the effects of Idea/
Expression Merger concepts.
21. For a discussion of the requirement to separate the "idea" of a copyrighted work from
its "expression," and of the associated Idea/Expression Merger Analysis, see infra notes 82-153
and accompanying text.
22. 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 672-73. 1991
Published23.
by eCommons,
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Among the questions presented by Lalli, but not specifically addressed in the Second Circuit's decision, is: does an arguably "creative"
algorithm for selecting24 and coordinating25 data, render the results of
that selection. copyrightable, even though it may be admitted that the
activity that occurs in executing the algorithm is "mechanical" in the
sense of Feist?
An argument in favor of copyrightability of Lalli's compilation
might assert that Feist's requirement for minimal creativity in selection, arrangement, or coordination should accommodate and be satisfied by the creativity inherent in Lalli's "algorithm." As the Supreme
Court indicated in Feist, the works that qualify for copyright are those
"founded in the creative powers of the mind, ..
the fruits of intellec2
6
tual labor."
Unimpressed by the relative complexity of the data manipulation
engaged in by Lalli, the Second Circuit was not compelled to address
this question but summarily derogated the Chart as a compilation of
preexisting facts2 7 that failed to meet Feist's minimum requirement.
The Second Circuit concluded, without elaboration, that Lalli had exercised no selectivity in what he reported. The Second Circuit's failure
to hold Lalli's compilation to the light of Feist's originality standard
may be excused by the fact that judgment was entered in the district
court prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Feist. This situation similarly prevails in the second case, Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.,2"
which is also considered in section II of this article. As with Lalli,

24. "Selection" of data occurs in considering only the sum of two dollar bets to win, place,
and show for each race.
25. "Coordination" of data occurs, first, by adding the sums selected in three ways: the
selected sums for the first three races, the first five faces, and then the first seven races, and
second, by presenting the last digit of the totals taken as a result of the three additions.
26. Feist, Ill S. Ct. at 1288. (quoting The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
One might anticipate a reference to section 102(b) of the Copyright Act in contravention of the
argument for copyrightability.
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
However, the copyright in Lalli's compilation would not preclude use of his "algorithm."
27. The notion that the results of Lalli's data manipulation, ultimately presented in the
Chart, may be casually dismissed as "preexisting facts" is open to challenge. Lalli did not merely
replicate data published in newspapers. He selected and manipulated "raw data," in order to
generate data that, but for Lalli's contribution, did not exist and would not have come into existence. See Feist, Ill S. Ct. at 1286.
For a discussion of the fallacy inherent in what one commentator refers to as "the Platonic
fact precept," see Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the
Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History After Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29
J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 647, 657-661 (1982).
28. 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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Sem-Torq's compilation presents issues, unnoticed by the courts and
apparently not urged by the parties, that fall into the interstices of
Feist.
C. Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.
Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.2 9 represents a pedagogically useful vehicle for exploring an arguably penumbra application of Feist's
standards for the copyrightability of compilations. Because the compilation in Sem-Torq would appear to have required rather minimal expenditure of labor or capital, that compilation would not enable a very
strong case for copyrightability under a sweat of the brow rationale.
Accordingly, its copyrightability, vel non, turns exclusively on the existence of a modicum of creativity in selection, arrangement, or coordination of its constituent elements.
The compilation in question in Sem-Torq was a set of five, plastic,
double-sided signs. Each of the signs bore a specific pairing of legends
on its respective sides, such as "For Rent"/"For Sale." 3 0 Development
of the sign set required selection of the number of signs for the set, the
specific legends to be included, and the pairing of the legends on the
front and the back of each sign. The Sixth Circuit's opinion indicated
that Sem-Torq's compilation was "the first set of multiple signs bearing
different legends on each side of the sign."' 3 The case was before the
court of appeals on appeal from the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of K Mart, in which the court held that Sem Torq's
compilation did not constitute copyrightable subject matter. In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit opined that:
[t]he set here, however, is no greater than the sum of its individual unprotected parts. The five double-sided signs comprising the set are not
sold as a set, nor was there any evidence of consumers buying them as a
set. In contrast, copyrightable compilations usually involve a work whose
value to consumers is in the combination of its individual parts ....
The resulting work, then, is the individual unprotected signs, not the
set."3
From the above, it may be concluded that the Sixth Circuit was disinclined to treat Sem-Torq's set of signs as a compilation. The focus of

29. Sem-Torq was decided June 17, 1991, less than three months after the Supreme Court's
decision in Feist. Id.
30. Id. at 852. In describing the signs, the Sixth Circuit also alludes to the coloring of the
signs' lettering and backgrounds. Id. For the purposes of this discussion of Sem-Torq, copyright
that might result from the decorative aspects of the signs will not be considered.
31. Id.
Published 32.
by eCommons,
1991 omitted).
Id. at 855 (citations
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the Sixth Circuit's attention was the use of the signs by the defendant,
K Mart. However, K Mart's use of the signs should have been recognized as irrelevant to a determination of the validity of Sem-Torq's
copyright. The Sixth Circuit's inquiry would have been more properly
directed to the subject matter in which Sem-Torq elected to assert
copyright. This is not an election to be made at the discretion of the
court, or the accused infringer.
It would appear that the Sixth Circuit was similarly disinclined to
apply Feist's standards regarding the copyrightability of compilations.
Irrespective of the unimpressive nature of Sem-Torq's compilation, it is
submitted that application of the copyrightability standards set out in
Feist should not have summarily foreclosed a determination of
copyrightability.
Perhaps the Sixth Circuit was unimpressed by the modest quantity, five double-sided signs, of subject matter in Sem-Torq's compilation. If the Sixth Circuit was dissuaded from apprehending copyrightability in Sem-Torq's sign set because of an unexpressed disdain for the
lack of effort or expense Sem-Torq expended in the creation of its sign
set, then what is operating here may be viewed as "reverse" sweat of
the brow: insufficient sweat militating against copyrightability. In determining copyrightability after Feist, the level of sweat expended
should no more cut against copyrightability than dispose in favor of it.
Assuming, however, that Sem-Torq's set of signs exceeded the
quantum of subject matter required to support copyright,"3 then, under
Feist, it is necessary to assess the degree of original selection, coordination, or arrangement involved in the creation of the sign set.
In this regard, the Sixth Circuit indicated that Sem-Torq's signs
were "the first set of multiple signs bearing different legends on each
side of the sign." 3 At least one commentator believes that "the absence
of similar compilations or selections . . . means that copyright validity
may not be rejected as a matter of law for lack of originality or creativ-

33. In a slightly different context-compilations of sound recordings-the Copyright Office
appears willing to consider for registration, compilations of more than three previously released
recordings. See, COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 497.02 (1984).
That five pairings of sign legends was, to the Copyright Office, disquietingly similar to three
recording selections was perhaps the reason the Copyright Office commented on the borderline
nature of Sem-Torq's "authorship." Sem-Torq, 936 F.2d at 851. It is not clear whether, in referring to authorship, the Copyright Office had in mind the quantum of subject matter for which
copyright registration was sought or the degree of originality associated with that subject matter.
Given the focus the Copyright Office practiced at the time of Sem-Torq's application for registration, the former would appear more likely.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
34. Id.
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ity. The . . .nonexistence of similar [works] is relevant to this issue. ' ' 3a
Accordingly, the subjective selection engaged in by Sem-Torq, both in
selecting a set of ten legends from the universe of legends available and
in identifying correlations between respective pairings of these legends,
persuasively suggests that Sem-Torq had comfortably cleared the
"'modicum of creativity" threshold erected by Feist.3 6
The Sixth Circuit's opinion does not reveal much about the mental
processes engaged in by Sem-Torq in choosing the pairings except that
"seasonal, demographic, and geographic factors" were considered.3 7
Manifestly, identification by Sem-Torq of a correlation, either negative
or positive, between the pairings of legends is entitled to probative
weight in an assessment of the originality associated with its compilation. Furthermore, it is entirely improbable that a complete factual determination of the aspects attending the creation of the compilation
would fail to demonstrate activity of the intellect beyond the mere
mechanical or routine that was disparaged in Feist.38
Much of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Sem-Torq seems to confuse
issues of infringement with issues of copyrightability. The manner in
which K Mart displayed the signs in a retail store, or packaged or sold
those signs, is irrelevant to a determination of the validity of SemTorq's copyright. However, had the Sixth Circuit found Sem-Torq's
sign set to comprise copyrightable subject matter, then the nature of K
Mart's activity would be relevant to a determination of infringement.
Analysis of copyright infringement, the topic of section III, would require the court to determine the scope of Sem-Torq's copyright and to
examine whether the signs distributed, reproduced, or displayed by K
Mart were substantially similar to subject matter within the scope of
that copyright.3 9

35. Neil Boorstyn, 6 COPYRIGHT L.J. (1991) (commenting on Kregos v. The Associated
Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991)).
36. Even William Patry, who had argued with vigor against the copyrightability of white
page listings, agrees that all that is required in order to render a collection of data copyrightable is
that the selection engaged in by the author result from an exercise of judgment in deciding which
items to take from a given universe of data. See, William F. Patry, Copyright in Compilations of
Facts (or Why the "White Pages" Are Not Copyrightable), 12 COMM. & L. 37 (1990).
37. Sem-Torq, 936 F.2d at 851.
38. Feist, 11I S. Ct. at 1286.
39. In order to prevail in its claim against an accused infringer, the owner of a copyrighted
work must establish that the accused work is substantially similar to the protectible expression
embodied in the copyright work. Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d
Cir. 1980); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 841 (1980). See also, Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 530 F. Supp.
1187, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aft'd, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). More specifically, plaintiffs
burden in a copyright infringement action is to demonstrate that defendant copied the requisite
amountby
ofeCommons,
protected material
Published
1991from plaintiffs work. Where direct proof of copying is not available,
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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

Scope of Copyright Protection

Abrogation by Feist of sweat of the brow as a permissible foundation for copyright not only eliminates copyright protection for some
works that otherwise would qualify as copyrightable subject matter,
but may also be expected to constrict the scope of copyright protection
available to works that do qualify. That is to say, prior to Feist, many
courts that embraced sweat of the brow would require subsequent compilers to start from scratch without reliance on the fact-gathering or
research engaged in by an original compiler. 40 Reliance on the copyrighted compilation to create a substantially similar compilation was
copyright infringement. However, in the post-Feist world, copyright no
longer subsists in compilations that result solely from the investment of
labor or expense by their author. It is now necessary to identify which,
if any, of the constituent parts of a compilation are original, as that
term is defined by Feist: not copied and the result of some minimal
degree of creativity. Once identified, it is that which not only imparts
copyrightability to the compilation, but also measures the scope of the
copyright. The Court tells us that "[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess
more than a de minimis quantum of creativity."4 Furthermore, as "applied to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written
expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair
nor unfortunate."4' 2 Therefore, "a subsequent compiler remains free to
use the facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a
competing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the
same selection and arrangement."4 3 Accordingly, the ability of a compiler to exclude second comers from taking portions of his compilation
depends on whether the portions taken were the result of some creative
activity-selection, arrangement, or coordination-on the part of the
compiler. Prior to Feist, even relatively small takings from a copyrighted compilation made out copyright infringement,4 " and there was

plaintiff may adduce circumstantial evidence, including proof of access to the copyrighted work by
defendant. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 191-92 (6th ed. 1986).
40. See. e.g., Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
41. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., III S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (interim ed.
1991).
42. Id. at 1290.
43. Id. at 1289.
44. In fact, copyright infringement analysis invokes a prerequisite threshold inquiry, sometimes referred to as the "de minimis" lest. See, e.g., G. R. Leonard & Co. v. Stack, 386 F.2d 38
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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seldom need for reflection on the compiler's creativity. Having drawn
abstractly the contours of protection associated with a compilation
copyright, the Court's copyright analysis in Feist was effectively
pretermitted by its determination that Rural's directory failed to evince
even minimal creativity in selection or arrangement.4 5 Because Feist
Publications did not misappropriate portions of Rural's directory that
were concededly copyrightable, there was no need to assay the scope of
protection associated with Rural's alphanumeric listings. Consequently,
Feist itself reveals little about the domain of the copyrights that emanate from works of.compilation.
It is clear that the sweat of the brow rationale enabled a court to
countenance a claim of copyright infringement directed at a second
compilation, even though the second compilation consisted of a rearrangement of the elements of a first copyrighted compilation. However,
if upon application of Feist, the copyright in the'first compilation is
found to result from and reside in only the original arrangement of
elements in the compilation, then rearrangement of the data in the accused compilation should not constitute copyright infringement. Conversely, if the copyrighted compilation is found to result from only an
original selection of elements to be included, then rearrangement of
those elements in the accused compilation should not, of itself, operate
to avoid infringement. Copyright infringement decisions antedating
Feist did not uniformly adopt this analysis.
Worth v. Selchow & Righter4" is notable for the arguably minimal
scope of protection attributed to a pre-Feist compilation of facts. It is
also instructive because of its reliance on precedent that anticipated
Feist by disavowing sweat of the brow as a foundation for copyright
protection417 and because of its endorsement of the requirement of original selection or arrangement.4
In Worth, the Ninth Circuit permitted the creators of the game
Trivial Pursuit to use as a source of factual information two volumes
of Worth's copyrighted encyclopedia. 49 Even though the accused infringers appropriated approximately 4000 of the 12,000 discrete entries

(7th Cir. 1967); see also, 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[A], at 13-46 n.lOl, and cases cited therein. According to the de minimis test, an accused
infringer is permitted to copy an amount of the copyrighted work, so long as the amount copied is,
quantitatively and qualitatively, an insignificant portion of the copied work.
45. From the above passages, one draws the inference, largely corroborated by the remainder of Justice O'Connor's opinion, that "'coordination" is the stepchild of the activities enumerated
in section 101's definition of "compilation." Cf. 17 U.S.C. section 101 (1988).
46. 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 572-73.
48. Id. at 573.
Published49.by Id.
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from the encyclopedia, the district court found that the scope of
Worth's copyright did not encompass that appropriation." In affirming,
the Ninth Circuit maintained that no copyright infringement resulted
from the alphabetical arrangement of facts in Worth's books because
the Trivial Pursuit questions and answers were organized and color
coded by subject matter and were randomly arranged on each game
card. " Therefore, there was no similarity between the respective arrangements of the two compilations and no intrusion on the scope of
protection that might be associated with Worth's arrangement.
As for the scope of protection resulting from Worth's selection of
facts, the Ninth Circuit agreed that there was likewise no infringement
by the game on this ground because "although Worth's books were the
source of many questions, the entire selection of facts in the books and
the game cards is not substantially similar." 52 The Ninth Circuit relied
on Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc."3 for the proposition that "[flactual works are not infringed in the absence of 'bodily appropriat[ion]' of expression. ' 54 It appears that in order for
Selchow & Righter's taking to be considered an infringement of a right
within the scope of Worth's copyright, the Ninth Circuit would have
required appropriation of Worth's complete selection of facts.5 5 Ostensibly, this requirement derives from the notion that "[b]ecause authors
who wish to express ideas in factual works are usually confined to a
'narrow range of expression . . ., similarity of expression may have to
amount to verbatim reproduction or very close paraphrasing before a
factual work will be deemed infringed.' "156

50. Id.
51. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit did not specifically pronounce on the amount of creativity represented by the alphabetical ordering of Worth's facts, one would perhaps err in assuming
that Worth's arrangement would encounter the level of disdain dispensed to Rural's directory.
Worth no doubt exercised at least minimal subjective judgment in identifying a single word that
would characterize a statement of fact and that could be used to alphabetize his compilation of
facts. Such subjective judgment should be sufficient to elevate the arrangement of Worth's encyclopedia above the "narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so
trivial as to be virtually nonexistent. Feist, Ill S. Ct. at 1294.
52. Worth, 827 F.2d at 1147 (emphasis added).
53. 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
54. Worth, 827 F.2d at 1147.
55. Id. at n.6.
56. Id. at 1147. (quoting Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488). However, at least one commentator
believes that the application of a higher standard of substantial similarity to nonfictional works
than to fictional works is erroneous:
There is no reason, factual or legal, justifying the establishment of a different standard
of substantial similarity for any class of work. It is noteworthy in this regard that in reversing the Second Circuit's decision in Harper & Row, . . . the Supreme Court held: "We
agree with the Court of Appeals that copyright is intended to increase and not to impede
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
the harvest of knowledge. But we believe the Second Circuit gave insufficient deference to
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It is submitted that the above, at least as applied to factual compilations, constitutes an unnecessarily niggardly perspective of the scope
of copyright protection, and particularly so after Feist. Constriction of
the scope of compilation copyright protection is intended to allay concerns regarding the abridgment of access to factual information that
might result from a copyright that implicates that factual information.
However, as a response, the approach adopted in Worth strikes high of
the mark. Professor Robert Denicola more reasonably proposes:
Recognizing a property interest in the collection of information contained in a copyrighted compilation need not raise the specter of the monopolist stifling future intellectual activity. Unfettered access to individual facts would continue to be assured by the traditional requirement of
substantial similarity. Since it is the collection as a whole that represents the original work of authorship, only copying sufficient to produce a
substantially similar collection would generate potential liability."'
Because Feist requires apprehension of at least minimally creative
selection or arrangement in the collection of "facts" that constitute a
copyrightable compilation, there appears little opportunity for a copyright owner to reserve unto himself subject matter that should properly
be widely accessible, if only upon the undertaking of some sweat of the
brow. After Feist, a copyrightable compilation necessarily represents
the manifestation of its author's personality, qua intellect. Recognition
of this phenomenon, it would seem, obviates any need to constrict the
scope of protection in fact-based compilations.

the scheme established by the Copyright Act for fostering the original works that provide
the seed and substance of this harvest." (citations omitted).
PATRY, supra note 39, at 193 n.31.
57. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 531 (1981)(emphasis added).
Professor Denicola agrees that copyright law properly offers little to one intent on maintaining control over individual facts, but suggests that "the calculus quickly changes as fact is piled
upon fact to yield no longer a simple statement, but a catalog, encyclopedia, a directory. Id. at
526. Professor Denicola concludes:
One promising approach is to find authorship in the act of aggregating isolated pieces of
information. The particular collection of data would thus itself be a work of authorship.
Unless the collection of data contained in the compilation has been copied from a preexisting source, it represents an original contribution of the author. The collection owes its
origin to the author as much as does the manner in which the collection is arranged. This
distinguishes the process of culling and assembling facts, which results in the collection,
from the discovery of the facts themselves, and thereby secures a spot for the collection
outside the category of discoveries, Which are expressly excluded from copyright protection
.... The cases sustaining infringement claims despite the absence of an appropriation of
arrangement support the conclusion that the particular collection of data contained in a
compilation may be considered a copyrightable element of the overall work.
Published
1991
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In her influential discourse on copyright protection for information
works, 58 Professor Jane Ginsburg observes that
[o]ne might analyze [copyright] infringement by examining the
originality of the copied portions. The more original the copied material,
the more protection .it should receive. Although the statute appears to
disqualify facts themselves from "original" status, the form in which the
facts are embodied nonetheless may be original. In low authorship compilations, however, the "original" form is so minimal-from a unitary,
high authorship, copyright perspective-that only the work in its entirety
deserves the designation "original work of authorship." It would follow,
therefore, that in this instance, the "original" element is not captured
unless the copier takes virtually all of the work. This analysis explains
how [Insert 1] can be an infringement. This analysis, however, does not
authorize findings of infringement in [use of the work as a "starting
point" to save a competitor time, money, and effort; and reproduction of
substantial elements of information in the creation of a different, not
directly competing work]. .... 5.

This perspective of the scope of copyright protection might appear
to disfavor compilation copyrights. By "low authorship compilation,"
Professor Ginsburg appears to be referring to "personality-deprived" 60
compilations that fail to "reflect the personalities of their authors or, at
the very least, [fail to] embody their creators' subjective choices in the
selection or arrangement of material."6 1 However, the "low-authorship" compilations are precisely those for which, after Feist, copyright
is no longer available. Copyrightable compilations now may be presumed to have benefitted from an infusion of their authors' personalities and may be presumed to be correlatively entitled to the scope of
protection dispensed to all other copyright works.

58. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection for Works of
Value, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990). Professor Ginsburg's article was cited by Justice
O'Connor in Feist. I Il S. Ct. at 1279. However, it is fair to say that the result in Feist is antithetical to Professor Ginsburg's thesis:
The error of our modern [copyright] doctrine lies in its implicit, but unexamined, claim
that a personality-based approach to copyright law has completely displaced the sweat/
investment model. Recognition of our dual bases for copyright not only would be more
faithful to our copyright history, but would also squarely confront the interests at issue in a
rapidly growing sector of publishing activity.
Ginsburg, supra, at 1870.
Feist not only ratifies "the error of our modern [copyright] doctrine" that Professor Ginsburg
eschews, but also constitutionalizes it.
59. Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 1904.
60. Id. at 1866.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
61. -1d. at 1867 (footnote omitted).
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Bellsouth Advertising and PublishingCo. v. Donnelly Information
Publishing2 provides a degree of insight into the nature of selection,
coordination, or arrangement of data that is adequate to accommodate
Feist's originality requirements. Bellsouth also provides insight into the
scope of protection associated with the copyright resulting from that
selection, coordination, or arrangement.
In Bellsouth, the Eleventh Circuit, by way of affirming the grant
of summary judgment on Bellsouth's claim of infringement of copyright in its yellow pages, found that Bellsouth had engaged in selection
by defining the geographic boundaries that corresponded to the scope of
its directory, 6" selecting a directory close date,"4 and creating or selecting numerous business classifications.1 5 Bellsouth had engaged in coordination of "all the current informational components of a particular
business into one complete business listing."6 6 Finally, Bellsouth's arrangement included the assignment of the various business listings and
67
associated advertisements to the appropriate business classification.
According to the Eleventh Circuit, Bellsouth's acts of selection, coordination, and arrangement contributed to produce a directory format that
met the "minimal level of independent creativity required [under Feist]
to qualify as original." 6 8
However, the scope of Bellsouth's copyright protected only the
"original format" and not "the bare information itself segregated from
the compilational format."6 9 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit agreed
that Donnelly had engaged in copyright infringement by the three distinct acts of keying formatted information into a computer, preparing
sales lead sheets, and publishing the Donnelly directories.7 0 It is noteworthy that each of these three infringing activities by Donnelly resulted in a work that, if evaluated solely on its superficial appearance,
would probably not have satisfied the similarity requirement that was
applied in Worth. However, each of Donnelly's infringing activities was
found to have appropriated enough of Bellsouth's protectible "format,"
primarily its business classifications, to constitute infringement.

62. 933 F.2d 952 (1lth Cir. 1991).
63. Id. at 957.
64. Id. The directory close date is the date after which no more listing modifications would
be reflected in the pending directory publication. Id. Presumably, the compilers of most telephone
white page directories similarly select geographic boundaries and close dates.
65. Id.
66. Id. This included, unremarkably, the name of the business with its address and telephone number. Id. at 957-58.
67. Id. at 958.
68. Id.
69. Id.
Published
at 958-60. 1991
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With respect to keying, the Eleventh Circuit found that keying information into a computer was, in fact, a physical act of copying.7 1
More troublesome for the court was that the data actually keyed for
each business listing consisted, in its material aspects, of a classified
heading code, an advertising code, and a directory code. The codes
were authored by, and were presumably original to, Donnelly. 72 Even
though Donnelly had not copied data that was facially similar to Bellsouth's protected format, the Eleventh Circuit held that infringement
had nonetheless occurred.7 3 Infringement was based on the Eleventh
Circuit's conclusion that Donnelly, through the use of a decoder key,7
had "retained the tools that [were] required to reconstitute [Bellsouth's] compilation.""
Even though Donnelly's lead sheets were arranged in a tabular
form that was different from the arrangement of Bellsouth's classified
business listings7 6 the lead sheets were held "to appropriate the coordination of informational components in a business listing and the selection of categories used by the [Bellsouth] format. ' 77 Because the "protected part of a compilation work is the 'selection, coordination, or
arrangement,' ",78 Donnelly's appropriation was held to be "substantial
and constitute[d] the copying of constituent elements of originality. ' 79
Publication of Donnelly's directories was a third act of infringement,
because "the overall format of [Bellsouth's] Yellow Pages [was] substantially appropriated in the Donnelly directories." 8
A number of issues are suggested by but not addressed in Bellsouth. If a compilation is determined to qualify for copyright because it
comprises a sufficiently creative selection, then, during an infringement
analysis, is it necessary to identify which aspects. of the selection are
creative and accordingly determine whether the accused work misap-

71. Id. at 958.
72. Id. at 959. According to the Eleventh Circuit, Donnelly's classified heading code corresponds to the type of business classification or classifications under which a particular business is
placed. The advertising code represents the number of units of advertising that the particular
business has purchased. The directory code signifies the directory or directories in which the business was listed thereby revealing its geographical arrangement. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. Apparently the decoder key allowed Donnelly to translate the keyed classified heading, advertising, and directory codes into the initial Bellsouth format. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Bellsouth arranged its classified business listings in a typical manner, according to
alphabetized business classification and, within each business classification, according to each business name. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 960.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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propriates a substantial portion of those aspects? Alternatively, in order
to make a case of infringement, must the accused work misappropriate
an amount that represents a substantial portion of the entirety of the
copyrighted work? As applied to Bellsouth, was Bellsouth's classification scheme original, and therefore copyrightable, in its entirety? Or,
were only portions of the classification scheme copyrightable? If the
latter, must the court compare an accused classification scheme to only
the original portions and then find substantial similarity? Or, is it permissible to compare the accused work with the entirety of the copyrighted work? Many of these issues are addressed, if not entirely disPublications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
posed of, more recently, in Key
8t
Publishing Enterprises, Inc.
B.

Idea/Expression Merger

It is a fundamental precept of copyright law that a copyright in a
work protects the expression of ideas conveyed by the work, but not
ideas themselves.8 Accordingly, in order to determine the scope of
copyright protection for any work, including works of compilation, a
line of demarcation must be drawn between protectible expression and
unprotectible idea. The process by which the line is drawn is generally
referred to as the "level of abstractions test."8 3
Perhaps the best known statement of the analytical problem implicated by the "abstractions test" is as set forth by Judge Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.84 :
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only on its title; but there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since

81. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991). See infra notes 160-180 and accompanying text.
82. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); see
generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 44, § 13.03 [B][2].
83. For an attempt to rationalize the manner in which courts draw the line between expression and idea, see I PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.3 (1989). Goldstein believes that courts, in
applying the "abstractions test," are generally solicitous of the copyright interest, so that "if a
work's idea can be expressed in more than one way, courts will protect its expression even though
the nature of the underlying idea closely circumscribes the variety of possible expression." Id. at
80-81. However less generous treatment may be bestowed on functional works, so as not to foreclose possible future uses of those works. id. In many works of compilation, there may be identified salient functional characteristics, apart from the conveyance of information.
84. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). Most would agree that there is no recognized "analytical
solution." See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, § 13.03[B][2]; Sid & Marty Krofft Television, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) ("No court or commentator
been
able to improve
Published
eCommons,
1991upon Judge Learned Hand's famous abstraction's 'test' . . . .").
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otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended .85
Judge Hand himself conceded that decisions on where to draw the line
of demarcation between idea and expression will "inevitably be ad
hoc.""6 The Copyright Act of 1976 codifies the requirement to separate
idea-and more-from expression in section 102(b):
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.87
Kregos v. The Associated Press8 8 represents the manner in which difficulties derived from the "abstractions test" present themselves in the
enforcement of copyrights in works of compilation. Kregos also demonstrates that the "abstractions test," as applied to compilations, assumes
some idiosyncratic ramifications that have a nexus to Feist.
The compilation in question in Kregos was a pitching form that
included nine items of information, grouped into three categories, regarding past performances of starting pitchers in that day's baseball
games.8" It was undisputed that prior to Kregos' form, no form listed
the same nine items, although some, but not all, of the categories of
information had appeared in other forms. Other forms that included
some of Kregos' categories also included categories not used by Kregos.
Finally, Kregos reported one category of information not known to be
reported anywhere else, at least over the time period covered by
Kregos' form. 90

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (citations omitted).
Peter Pan Fabrics,274 F.2d at 489 (emphasis in original).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
As identified by the Second Circuit:
The first category in Kregos' 1983 form, performance during the entire season, comprises two items-won/lost record (1) and earned run average (2). The second category,
performance during the entire season against the opposing team at the site of the game,
comprises three items-won/lost record (3), innings pitched (4), and earned run average
(5). The third category, performance in the last three starts, comprises four items-won/
lost record (6), innings pitched (7), earned run average (8), and men on base average (9).
This last item is the average total of hits and walks given up by a pitcher per nine innings
of pitching.
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 702.
90. Id. at 702-03. No previously appearing form had supplied a men-on-base average over
the three most recent starts, as did Kregos' form. Id. at 703.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of The
Associated Press, ruling that Kregos' form was not copyrightable
because:

(1) Kregos' form was insufficiently original in 'its selection of statistics to warrant copyright;
(2) due to the limited space available in newspapers to publish
pitching forms, the idea of Kregos' pitching form had merged into its
expression; and
(3) Kregos' form ran afoul of the so-called "blank form"
doctrine.9"
Although the Second Circuit's views on the "originality" and
"blank form" issues are instructive,92 in time it is likely that its treatment of Idea/Expression Merger issues will come to be recognized as
the most significant precedential contribution of Kregos. In resolving
these issues, the Second Circuit seems to have confronted Idea/Expression Merger strains that may prove to be unique to, and inherent in,

compilation copyright situations.
The Second Circuit began its analysis with a statement of the virtually axiomatic copyright principle that "only the expression of an
idea and not the idea itself is protectible." 93 The Second Circuit followed with the corollary maxim that "even expression is not protected
in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing
an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord pro94
tection to the idea itself."

91. Id. at 703.
92. In applying Feist's requirement of at least "some minimal level of creativity," the Seccannot be said as a matter of law that in selecting nine items for his
ond Circuit held that "[iut
pitching form out of the universe of available data, Kregos has failed to display enough selectivity
to satisfy the requirement of originality." Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704. No prior pitching form had
exhibited a selection that was identical to, or'only a trivial variation of, Kregos' form. Id. at 705.
Furthermore, with respect to the Blank Form Doctrine, the Second Circuit indicated that
many courts had recognized, and Copyright Office regulations permit the inference, that there can
be protectible elements of forms, even though those forms include considerable blank space. -[A]
writing that contain[s] a selection of categories of information worth recording, sufficiently original and creative to deserve a copyright as a compilation of facts, cannot lose that protection simply because the work also contains blank space for recording the information. Id. at 708. See also
37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (1991).
93. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705 (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)).
94. Id. Frequently cited authority for what has come to be known as the Merger Doctrine is
found in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). In Rosenthai, the Ninth Circuit held that even a finding that defendant had copied plaintiff's jeweled bee
pin would not justify a judgment of infringement, if it could be said that the "idea" of plaintiff's
pin was indistinguishable from its expression. The Ninth Circuit believed that there was "no
greater similarity between the pins of plaintiff and defendants [sic) than is inevitable from the use
in both." Id. at 742.
bee forms
encrusted
of jewelby
Published
eCommons,
1991

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:2

The Second Circuit then articulated the fundamental concern in
any Idea/Expression Merger determination:
Determining when the idea and its expression have merged is a task
requiring considerable care: if the merger doctrine is applied too readily,
arguably available alternative forms of expression will be precluded; if
applied too sparingly, protection will be accorded to ideas. Recognizing
this tension, courts have been cautious in applying the merger doctrine to
selections of factual information. 5
In contention for adoption as the "idea" that appropriately defined
Kregos' work were (1) the general proposition that statistics can be
used to assess pitching performance 6 and (2) more precisely, "that the
nine statistics . . .selected [by Kregos] are the most significant ones
to consider when attempting to predict the outcome of a baseball
game." 7 Merely upon formulation of the contending putative "ideas,"
it becomes readily apparent that the "idea" selection made by the Second Circuit will be, as such determinations almost always are, determinative of the scope of protection, if any, to be allocated to Kregos'
copyright.9 8 That is, if the proper idea to be associated with Kregos'
work is sufficiently abstract to accommodate numerous modes of expression, then Kregos' copyright endures. However, application of the
Merger Doctrine to the specific idea will likely animate the conclusion
that, because there is effectively only one way to express the specific
idea, Kregos' expression merges with the underlying idea, fracturing
copyright in the process.
Accordingly, if, as maintained by the majority of the Second Circuit, the appropriate idea to be associated with Kregos' compilation of
pitching statistics is simply that statistics can be used to assess pitching
performance, then, given the variety of pitching statistics from which a
compiler might choose, there exists a myriad of ways to express that
idea. 9 Conversely, if, as Judge Sweet asserts in his dissent, the idea

95. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705.
96. Id. This was that "idea" adopted by the district court, but considered by the court to be
capable of expression in only a limited number of ways.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. It has been argued that, at least with respect to computer software, application of the
abstractions test should recognize that a given work may comprise a number of underlying ideas.
All of the work's ideas should be considered in order to ascertain whether the associated expressions warrant copyright protection. See Nimmer, supra, note 15, at 17.
99. For, as the Second Circuit pointed out in the course of discussing the copyrightability of
Kregos' form, if the universe of available pitching is assumed to consist of only 20 categories, then
there are 167,960 ways to design a pitching form that includes 9 categories. Kregos, 937 F.2d at
704. In suggesting precisely how one of those other 167,979 compilations might have been constructed, Judge Newman revealed his own familiarity with the finer points of our national pastime, and perhaps authored his own compilation of categories of useful pitching statistics:
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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underlying Kregos' compilation is to present the nine most significant
statistics to consider in the prediction of the outcome of a baseball
game, then, "merger of [Kregos'] idea and its expression has occurred-by definition."1 '
In concluding that the district court had hit upon the correct prescription of Kregos' idea,"' the Second Circuit established and applied
the following guideline:
As long as selections of facts involve matters of taste and personal opinion, there is no serious risk that withholding the merger doctrine will
extend protection to an idea. That was surely the case with the selection
of premium baseball cards in Eckes . .

.

.However, where a selection of

data is the first step in an analysis that yields a precise result or even a
better-than-average probability of some result, protecting the "expression" of the selection would clearly risk protecting the idea of the
analysis.1"2
The distinction drawn by the Second Circuit here is between an
idea that is inherently imprecise and abstract because it is stated in
terms of, or is necessarily expressed by, an author's subjective judgment, taste, or opinion, and an idea that is relatively precise because it
is susceptible of an objectively determinable expression. The more general or imprecise the idea of a compilation is, the more likely it is that
there will exist a variety of ways to express that idea. Conversely, precise ideas will by their nature admit of only a limited number of expressions, and, as a result, the Merger Doctrine will likely operate to
preclude copyright protection.

[Kregos] could have chosen strikeouts, walks, balks or hit batters . . . . [Hie could have
counted . . .the number of innings in which the side was retired in order, or in which no
runner advanced as far as second base. Or he could have focused on performance under
pressure by computing the percentage of innings in which a runner scored out of the total
innings in which a runner reached second base.
Id.
100. Id. at 706 (emphasis added). Although the Second Circuit did not specifically so state,
presumably merger would occur "by definition" because there is, undeniably, only one way to
express the nine most significant statistics to consider.
101. According to the Second Circuit, the district court believed that Kregos' idea was "an
outcome predictive pitching form," but concluded that the idea of selecting outcome predictive
statistics to rate pitching performance was capable of expression in only a very limited number of
ways. Id. at 706-07.
102. Id. at 707 (citations omitted). In addition to referring to Eckes, the Second Circuit
cited a footnote in New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc. that discussed the nature
of the activity engaged in by a compiler of a social directory. Roxbury, 434 F. Supp. 217. To wit:
[T]he compilation of a social directory involves the compiler's subjective judgment of who
within a community possesses a social status sufficient to require listing in his directory.
Each name in a social directory is a product of the compiler's judgment rather than the
publication of a fact.
Published
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The Second Circuit believes that there is a "continuum spanning
matters of pure taste to matters of predictive analysis." ' Kregos' compilation of pitching statistics lies somewhere between the extremities of
this continuum because
[hie is doing more than simply saying that he holds the opinion that his
nine performance characteristics are the most pertinent. He implies that
his selections have some utility in predicting outcomes. On the other
hand, he has not gone so far as to provide a system for weighing the
combined value of nine characteristics for each of two opposing pitchers
and determining a probability as to which is more likely to win."0
Upon reflection, it would appear that the Second Circuit's reasoning does not thoroughly insulate Kregos' compilation from all proscriptions under the Merger Doctrine. It might be agreed that Kregos' work
does not purport to prescribe the manner in which the included statistics are to be combined so as to provide a prediction. Consequently,
Kregos does not seek to extend his copyright to what might properly
be denominated a "procedure, process, system, [or] method of
operation." 1 5
On the other hand, to characterize the "idea" of Kregos' compilation as an opinion-that the selected nine statistics are pertinent-does
not entirely extricate the compilation from Merger Doctrine entanglements. If it is accurate to say that any compiler of statistics, whose
compilation is intended to serve the same predictive purpose as Kregos'
compilation, would likely select a set of statistics that is not substantially similar to the set selected by Kregos, then the Merger Doctrine
should not operate to abrogate protection for Kregos' expression of that
idea. Conversely, if the nature of the purpose of a copyrighted compilation and its associated subject matter are such that other compilers
seeking to achieve the same purpose as intended by the compilation
are, irrespective of the exercise of their own subjective judgment, likely
to generate a compilation substantially similar to the copyrighted compilation, then the Merger Doctrine should operate to circumscribe, or
eliminate, protection for the copyrighted compilation.
103. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707.
104. Id.
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In
Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court remarked on the respective domains of copyright and patent:
The copyright of the book, if not pirated from other works, would be valid without regard
to the novelty, or want of novelty, of its subject-matter. The novelty of the art or thing
described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright. To give to the
author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination
of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud copyright. That
is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
Id. at 102.
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In this regard, it is useful to maintain a distinction between two
very similar, but nonetheless distinguishable, strains of the Merger
Doctrine. 0 0 The first strain, which seems to have arisen in Baker v.
Selden and to ultimately have been codified in section 102(b), generally
holds that an expression that is necessarily incident to an "art" it
teaches is not protectible by copyright.1 0 7 The second strain, enunciated
in, if not originating with, Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian,10 8 holds generally that "[w]hen [an] 'idea' and its 'expression' are . . .inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be barred,
since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a
monopoly of the 'idea.' "109 With the above distinctions in mind, one
might conclude that both strains are implicated by Kregos' and, probably, most other factual compilations.
For example, if it were true that Kregos' idea-that statistics can
be used to predict pitching performance-was susceptible of only one
expression, or of only a limited number of expressions, then Kregos'
compilation of pitching statistics would properly be deemed to have
merged, by operation of the Rosenthal strain of the Merger Doctrine,
with the idea ascribed to that compilation. Because the majority in
Kregos believed there to be numerous ways to express Kregos' idea, the
Rosenthal strain of the Merger Doctrine was held not to deprive
Kregos' compilation of copyright protection. Manifestly, it could not be
said that there was only one way to express Kregos' idea. Furthermore,
the majority concluded that the simple compilation of nine categories
of statistics does not rise to the level of process or method.
However, had Kregos further refined his work so as to specify
weighting factors to be assigned to each of the nine statistical items

106. It will be demonstrated here that Judge Sweet, in dissent, without specifically enumerating, relies on both strains, as well as a third, and would find Kregos' compilation unprotectible
based on all three. See infra text accompanying notes 111-120.
107. For this purpose, "art" may be taken to include, but not necessarily be limited to, any
subject matter within the purview of patent: "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "Process," in turn, means "process, art, or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." Id. § 100.
In addition, it has also been argued that section 102(b) of the Copyright Act renders the
Copyright Act self-preemptive, thereby establishing the primacy of patent law over copyright.
[Olver the decades, Congress and the courts have laboriously achieved a hard-won policy
balance between competing legitimate interests. This balance has resulted in a detailed,
carefully-crafted system of patent law as Congress's chosen, nationally uniform vehicle for
rewarding innovation in utility and functionality, which preempts other forms of federal
and state intellectual property protection in these areas.
See D.C. Toedt, Bonito Boats and the Primacy of the Patent System - Are There Implications
for Software Functionality Copyrights, 6 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 12, 16 (1989).
108. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
at 742.
109.byId.
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and the calculus by which the items of statistical data were to be combined, then he would likely be deemed to have defined, that is, "expressed," 1 10 a procedure, process, system, or method of operation, in
contravention of the Baker/section 102(b) strain of the Merger Doctrine. Consequently, this hypothetically refined expression of Kregos'
work would properly be denied some ambit of copyright protection.
This result would be obtained regardless of whether the hypothetical
expression represented only one of a number of ways of effecting the
associated procedure, process, system, or method.
A more difficult question is whether a court would afford any
copyright protection to the hypothetical work. The hypothetical work
should be recognized as including the nine statistical items included in
Kregos' actual work, and more. It would appear irrational to deprive
the hypothetical work of at least the scope of protection afforded
Kregos' actual work, solely on the basis of the hypothetical, work's inclusion of the "and more" subject matter. However, in order to arrive
at this result, a court, when assessing the protection available to the
hypothetical work, must possess a level of sophistication sufficient to
apprehend the tunicate nature of the copyrightable subject matter constituting the hypothetical compilation. In effect, the court would be required to peel away the process-defining subject matter and identify the
compilation of statistical items as distinctly deserving of copyright
protection.
In his dissent, Judge Sweet was concerned that Kregos was, in
fact, attempting to use his copyright to prevent others from practicing
a system of handicapping baseball games.' In addition, he took exception to the majority's statement of Kregos' idea, and argued that the
majority had not "set forth convincing grounds for its determination as
to the idea at issue here.""' 2

110. In Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., a landmark decision extending the scope of
copyright protection in for software beyond literal source and object code, the Third Circuit concluded that "the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea." 797"F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the Third Circuit held the structure,
sequence and organization of the subject software to be "expression" and therefore protected by
copyright. Id. at 1238-40.
Whelan has drawn fire from a number of quarters. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 44, § 13.03[F], at 13-62.34. See also Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11431 (E.D.N.Y. August 9, 1991). (Whelan is inadequate and inaccurate;
Nichols v. Universal Pictures articulation of abstractions test is more appropriate.) Nevertheless,
Whelan's identification of the purpose of a utilitarian work as the idea of the work would appear
to be valid and accepted, and applicable to works of compilation.
III. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 711 (Sweet, J., dissenting).
112. Id. Judge Sweet properly noted that the level at which the idea of a work is formulated
is determinative of the outcome of an application of the Merger Doctrine. Id. In addition, Judge
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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With respect to the abstractions test determination, Judge Sweet
could not accept that Kregos' idea was merely that pitching statistics
were useful as predictors of the outcomes of baseball games. According
to Judge Sweet, in those instances where the compiler's main purpose is
to select data that will allow a reader of the compilation to reach a
clearly defined goal, then the idea that must be attributed to that compilation is that the compilation represents "the most useful selection
possible." ' 3 However, even if this somewhat arbitrary proposition is
accepted on its face, there is no suggestion in Kregos of exogenous factors that would operate to telescope the possible expressions of that
idea to one mode, or to a very limited number of modes.11 4 Consequently, it, is fair to assume that any number of prospective compilers,
intending to use pitching statistics as a predictor of the outcome of a
baseball game, would in all likelihood generate compilations that are
not mutually substantially similar. The constituent elements of each
compilation would depend on which set of statistical items each of the
compilers subjectively judged to comport with his own conception of
the most useful selection. So long as there exists no objective determinant of the statistical items that maximize the utility of the compilation, so that each compiler's notion of "utility" itself must be recognized as subjective, then it cannot be cogently maintained that the
"expression" of a compilation such as Kregos' has merged with its underlying idea.
Furthermore, as alluded to above, Judge Sweet considered Kregos'
compilation of statistics to "constitute[] an explanation of [Kregos']
preferred system of handicapping baseball games." 11 5 As support for
this proposition, Judge Sweet pointed to assertions, both in the district
court and on appeal, that Kregos' pitching form " 'convey[s] to his subscribers the categories of information which Kregos himself subjectively considers to be important for evaluating pitching perform-

Sweet's perception that the majority had failed to establish the grounds by which it determined
the appropriate level of abstraction to be ascribed to Kregos' work highlights an aspect that appears common to almost all "abstractions test" determinations: courts rarely reveal the considerations that influence those determinations.
113. Id. at 712 (Sweet, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
114. See Plains Cotton Co-op v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1987). The Fifth Circuit observed that "externalities" imposed by the environment in which the
copyrighted software was intended to operate limit the scope of protection afforded to the copyright in that software. See also, Peter Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection
for Application Programs,41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989) (arguing, inter alia, that application of
the Merger Doctrine to computer software should consider restraints imposed on "expression" by
the functions the software is intended to perform).
Published115.
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ance.' "6 Judge Sweet construed this statement to be an admission by
Kregos that his form incorporates an explanation of his outcome-predicting system.1" Judge Sweet's arguments notwithstanding, the majority would appear to have the better of the arguments on this score:
Kregos has not devised a system that he seeks to withdraw from the
public domain by virtue of copyright. He does not present his selection of
nine statistics as a method of predicting the outcome of baseball games.
His idea is that of "an outcome predictive pitching form" in the general
sense that it selects the facts that he thinks newspaper readers should
consider in making their own predictions of outcomes. He does not purport to weight the nine statistics, much less provide a method for comparing the aggregate value of one pitcher's statistics against that of the
opposing pitcher in order to predict an outcome or even its probability of
occurring. " 8
Accordingly, Kregos did not express a "system" of handicapping, certainly not in the sense demonstrated by the forms or textual explanations to be used in conjunction with the accounting system involved in
Baker v. Selden.
Judge Sweet identified a final aspect of the majority's idea that
tended to disqualify that idea for copyright protection. Specifically,
Judge Sweet was concerned that prior to Kregos' compilation, other
compilers had apprehended the same idea that was attributed by the
majority to Kregos' compilation and had similarly used pitching statistics to handicap baseball games. Therefore, Judge Sweet was unwilling
to accept, as the proper idea to attribute to Kregos' compilation, an
idea that was not adequately "creative," that is, not sufficiently dissimilar from known ideas." 9 Because similar formats had also antedated
the format of Kregos' compilation, the only aspect of the compilation
that could be considered Kregos' "creation" was the specific choice of
statistical items to be included in his compilation. Consequently, Judge
Sweet deemed Kregos' expression to be inseparable from his idea. 20
Rather than explicitly relying on Feist for this ground of his dissent, Judge Sweet made reference to a number of pre-Feist compilation

116. Id. (quoting Appellant's (Kregos') Brief at 30, Kregos v. The Associated Press, 937
F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7469)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 706.
119. A related perspective of the manner in which creativity is relevant to Idea/Expression
Merger analysis was evinced in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l. 740 F. Supp. 37
(D. Mass. 1990). In ruling on the copyrightability of the user interface provided by LOTUS 1-23, the court opined that "[w]hen a particular expression goes no farther than the obvious, it is
inseparable from the idea itself." Id. at 59.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
120. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 711 (Sweet, J., dissenting).
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cases,' 21 including Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. Kluwer Law Book
Publishers, Inc.' 22 However, Judge Sweet's reliance on Matthew
Bender would appear to be tenuous. The court in Matthew Bender
identified as the idea of Bender's work "to provide attorneys working
on a medical malpractice case with a useful guide, in chart form, outlining the results achieved in prior similar cases."' 2 a In holding
Bender's volume not to be copyrightable, the court stated baldly that
the "modicum of selectivity, coordination or arrangement required . . .
to qualify for copyright protection is simply not present." It cannot be
said that the editors at Bender "exercised judgment and selectivity in
choosing items" to include in the chart. The categories which Bender
employed in its charts are the only sensible ones which could have been
124
used .
The above passage from the district court's opinion in Matthew
Bender might dispose an observer to the assumption that the court was
assessing, as Feist might instruct, copyrightability in terms of an originality requirement that includes creativity as a component. However,
based on the court's articulation of the issue to be decided, the assumption would be erroneous: "The question remains, however, whether
Bender's use of a particular chart with chapter and subchapter headings exceeds the boundaries of 'idea' and enters the realm of 'expression,' thereby rendering these elements protectible under federal copyright law."' 2 5 Clearly the district court viewed its decision as turning
on Idea/Expression Merger grounds. Because, any noncreative approach to "provid[ing] attorneys . . . a useful guide, in chart form,
outlining the results achieved in prior similar cases" 2 6 would converge
with Bender's expression of that idea, the court held Bender's expres-

121. Judge Sweet distinguished Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d
Cir. 1986); Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986); and Eckes v. Card
Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
122. 672 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Matthew Bender, plaintiff's copyright resided in
a 635-page original volume that presented information relating to personal injury and wrongful
death awards and settlements. The volume was arranged into 30 subchapters, each dedicated to a
specific body-part category. Each of the subchapters was divided into subdivisions according to
whether recovery was a result of a settlement or a judgment that was considered to be "adequate," "inadequate," or "excessive." The subdivisions were further subdivided alphabetically according to the state of jurisdiction and quantitatively within each jurisdiction according to the
amount of settlement. Id. Within the subchapters, subdivisions, and "sub-subdivisions," there appeared charts that incorporated categories of information: "Amount," "Case," "Plaintiff,"
"Event," "Injury," "Relevant Data." Id. at 108. The court found that "the two systems of categorization are virtually identical." Id.
123. Id.at 110.
124. Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
125. Id.at 109.
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sion not to be protectible. 12 7 In doing so, however, the court paid short
shrift to aspects of Bender's compilation that deserved examination for
the manner in which they affect copyrightability. Specifically, Bender's
subjective selection of body-part categories would seem to be potentially capable of satisfying Feist's originality requirement, 2 8 as well as
affording sufficient opportunity for variety of expression that would
avoid Idea/Expression Merger strictures. In addition, Bender's rather
elaborate, hierarchical arrangement29 of its compilation should have
similar copyright-imparting effect.
Nevertheless, Judge Sweet's invocation of creativity requirements
in the context of Idea/Expression Merger analysis stimulates a number
of observations. Irrespective of whether Idea/Expression Merger issues
are preferably applied in the infringement rather than the copyrightability phase of a copyright litigation,13 the specie of "creativity" that

127. In what was perhaps the most telling pronouncement of its reasons for denying copyright protection to Bender's compilation, the court stated that
an examination of these charts reveals that they could also be used to compile data on
claims for disability benefits by persons involved in an accident at work, or-insurance
claims by those injured in automobile accidents. Given the broad and general nature of
these charts, and their potential use in a wide variety of settings, it is clear that Bender
cannot own a copyright on them.
Matthew Bender, 672 F. Supp. at 112.
128. See Bellsouth Advertising v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, 933 F.2d 952 (1 th Cir. 1991);
supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 121.
130. In a collateral dispute, Judge Sweet also disagreed with the view of the majority of the
Second Circuit that Idea/Expression Merger analysis is relevant to a determination of copyright
infringement, maintaining, rather, its relevance to the issue of copyrightability. Judge Sweet supported his position by reference to section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which he properly construed to deny copyright protection to any work that is inseparable from, that is, has merged with,
its underlying idea. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 715 (Sweet, J., dissenting). From this construction of §
102, Judge Sweet apparently drew the dubious inference that Idea/Expression Merger analysis
must be restricted to copyrightability determinations. However, "copyright protection" is not tantamount to copyrightability, but is a function of copyrightability as well as the scope of the copyright in question. To the extent that an inquiry into whether subject matter copied by the defendant is within the scope of plaintiff's copyright is an infringement determination, it would seem
beyond dispute that Idea/Expression Merger analysis is a component of that determination.
The majority reasoned that "la]ssessing merger in the context of alleged infringement will
normally provide a more detailed and realistic basis for evaluating the claim that protection of
expression would inevitably accord protection to an idea." Id. at 705. This somewhat counterintuitive proposition is arguably supported by a number rationales, in addition to the one advanced by
the majority.
Applying Idea/Expression Merger analysis in the context of infringement rather than
copyrightability assures that courts "rarely need to draw an authoritative line between a particular works's protectible expression and its unprotectible ideas. To resolve the infringement issue, a
court need only determine whether the taking by defendant falls on the side of expression or
idea." I GOLDSTEIN supra note 83, § 2.3, at 75. Presumably, in most instances the ambit of the
copyright infringement defendant's misappropriation will be sufficiently remote from the abstractions test's line of demarcation that the line of demarcation will need not be surveyed with precihttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
sion in order to ascertain whether infringement has occurred.
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Judge Sweet appears to favor is distinctly more demanding than that
which the Supreme Court specified in Feist. Feist instructs that what is
131
required is merely "more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.
The standard is not stringent; innovation is not required; and the results need not be surprising. 13 What is required is merely "'the exis-.
tence of . . . intellectual production, of thought, and conception,' ,,133
activity that cannot be "so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.134 On the other hand, it seems that Judge Sweet
would require creativity that is more akin to the patent law require-

An excerpt from Judge'Sweet's dissenting opinion in Kregos provides insight into a second
reason why courts might prefer to conduct Idea/Expression Merger analysis at the infringement
stage:
[T]he pertinent issue in Baker [v. Selden] was not that Selden's book explaining the system was separable from the forms for using the system (in fact the forms were part of the
book), but rather was that he sought to use his copyright in the book to prevent others from
using the system. It was this use of the copyright which the Baker court condemned, and
regardless of any intervening developments concerning the idea/expression issue, the reasoning remains as sound today as the day it was written.
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 713 (Sweet, J., dissenting). That is, application of Idea/Expression Merger
analysis in the context of the accused infringement will allow the court to scrutinize the nature of
the defendant's activities that the copyright owner claims represent an infringement of his exclusive rights. If an asserted claim of copyright infringement requires for substantiation a corresponding scope of copyright that would prevent the infringer any meaningful opportunity to, for
example, practice a method, that scope is inappropriate and should fall prey to the Merger Doctrine's constraints.
A third reason courts might be inclined to postpone Idea/Expression Merger analysis until
the infringement stage is that portions of the evidence that would be introduced to establish lack
of access by the accused infringer to the copyrighted work would also be pertinent to IdealExpression Merger analysis. Specifically, the existence of other works similar to the plaintiff's copyrighted work could be used as circumstantial evidence that the defendant copied from those works
rather than plaintiff's work. However, the fact that works intended for the same purpose as plaintiff's all assume'the same expression suggests that there may be only one way, or a very limited
number of ways, to realize ("express") that purpose. After Feist, the fact that other works similarly or identically express the idea associated with plaintiff's works is relevant to establish the
lack of originality in plaintiff's work.
Finally, in the spirit of judicial restraint, courts should prefer to decide copyright infringement suits on the basis that defendant's work does not infringe, rather than on the basis that
plaintiff's copyright is invalid. In order to do so, however, the issue of copyrightability might
better be confined simply to an assessment of the work's compliance, vel non, with Feist's originality requirement. If this threshold copyrightability question is answered in the affirmative, Ideal
Expression Merger analysis may be appropriately applied in the infringement determination.
In any event, Judge Sweet may have arrived at a diplomatic solution by acceding to assessment of Merger Doctrine issues in the context of infringement, provided the assessment is conducted for the purpose of determining the copyrightability of the plaintiff's work, rather than the
defendant's infringement. Id. at 716.
131. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., -1l S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (interim ed.
1991).
132. Id. at 1296.
133. Id. (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 59 (1884)).
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ment of nonobviousness.'3 5 It is submitted that such a standard is inapposite in copyright law, which does not recognize infringement unless
the accused infringer has copied from the copyrighted work.13 6
Furthermore, Feist itself grants no warrant for the assertion that
the copyrightability of a compilation, or the scope of the copyright in
that compilation, is a function of the originality of the idea associated
with that compilation. Feist speaks only to the first branch, originality
of expression, of a ramate copyrightability criterion that may be seen to
also include, as a second branch, compliance with Idea/Expression
Merger strictures.
Finally, the introduction of creativity requirements that comprise
patent-like aspects of novelty or ingenuity would precipitate a metastasis in copyright decision-making that promises to significantly complicate infringement inquiries. As a result, courts deciding copyright infringement cases would be required to evaluate the originality of the
copyrighted work with reference to preexisting works. This would follow along much the same lines as presently required in patent infringement suits, 3 7 albeit without the benefit of a prior administrative examination procedure substantively comparable to that conducted by the
Patent and Trademark Office, and without the benefit of any meaningful, a priori statement by the copyright owner of the subject matter to
38
which his exclusive rights pertain.1
Whatever may be said of the approach adopted by the Second Circuit in Kregos, it is clear that the court was able to identify no
landmarks in its attempt to properly draw the line between the idea of
Kregos' work and its expression. There appear to be few, if any, generally applicable guidelines to assist courts in these nettlesome determinations. For as the Ninth Circuit observed in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian:

135. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
136. This is but one example of the substantive differences between copyright and patent
that justify patent law's more stringent requirements for entitlement to exclusionary rights. A
comprehensive discussion of this topic is not possible here. For an enumeration of some of the
many characteristics of the patent system that distinguish patent from copyright. See Toedt,
supra note 107, at 13-15.
137. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). In addressing the validity of a
patent, Graham requires that "the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of
the subject matter is determined. Id. at 17.
138. In contradistinction, patent law requires that the specification of a patent "conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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The critical distinction between "idea" and "expression" is difficult to
draw. As Judge Hand candidly wrote, "[o]bviously, no principle can be
stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and
has borrowed its 'expression.' " At least in close cases, one may suspect,
the classification the court selects may simply state the result reached
rather than the reason for it.13 9
In Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc.,14 the court, ostensibly foundering for guidelines to assist in drawing the line between idea and expression, not only was unable to state the "reason" for its idea/expression
demarcation, but also the "result."
In Mason, the copyright owner had created 118 land ownership
maps using title data obtained from the public record as well as data
supplied by the defendant. Although it is not entirely clear from the
court's written opinion, it appears that, in order to create the land ownership maps, Mason was required to interpret, in some manner, the
data available to it. Mason contended that Montgomery made unauthorized use of Mason's copyrighted maps in creating certain reorganized
map sets, overlays, and computer databases.141
In granting Montgomery's motion for partial summary judgment
that Mason's maps were not copyrightable, the district court found that
the idea of Mason's maps was "inseparable from its expression embodied within the maps, and hence not subject to copyright protection." '4 2
The court vacillated in its articulation of Mason's idea. It is, therefore,
difficult to determine whether the court perceived Mason's "idea" to be
(i) simply the creation of the land ownership maps, (ii) creation of
maps that "include[] drawing the abstract and tract boundaries, indicating the ownership name, the tract size, and other factual information," or (iii) creating "the only pictorial presentation which could result from a correct interpretation of the legal description and other
factual information relied upon by [Mason] in producing maps. '"143
The court's application of the Idea/Expression Merger analysis, to
any of Mason's "ideas," is unsatisfying for a number of reasons. If the
idea of Mason's work is simply the creation of land ownership maps,
then each of the maps should be recognized as a compilation of data,
the selection, coordination, and/or arrangement of which was original

139. 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).
140. 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1393 (S.D. Texas 1991).
141. Id. at 1394.
142. Id. at 1396. The district court's formulation of the Merger Doctrine was: "When the
idea and its expression are thus inseparable, copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the expression in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law." Id. at 1395 (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kilpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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to Mason because it resulted from an exercise of his subjective judgment. Although it is not conceptionally clear what "inseparability" of
idea and expression connotes, it seems that this formulation of the
Merger Doctrine should easily tolerate a specific realization of a compilation of data that may be selected, coordinated, and/or arranged in a
very large number of ways.
Furthermore, the court's second articulation of Mason's idea is
reminiscent of the position adopted by the dissent in Kregos in that it
virtually defines the idea in terms of Mason's expression of it. Consequently, it is merely a truism to state that Mason's idea is inseparable
from its expression. According to this court, Mason's idea is its expression. Except in compelling circumstances, such an arbitrarily literal articulation of the idea of a work should be unacceptable per se.
Finally, the court's third articulation of Mason's idea, the pictorial
presentation which results from a correct interpretation of the data,
denies copyright benefit to any subjective judgments or interpretations
of available data that Mason may have imparted to the maps."' To the
extent that the judgmental or interpretive aspects of Mason's maps did
not consist of or subsume public domain data, but only manifested Mason's original extrapolation of that data, no purpose of the Merger Doctrine is served by denying copyright protection. It is conceivable, if not
likely, that others approaching the source data from which Mason compiled its maps, would create maps substantially different from the copyrightable aspects of Mason's maps. The court does not indicate the
manner in which other authors, even those intending to create a "correct interpretation" of the original data, would be constrained by a
copyright in Mason's original contribution to that data. What seems
problematic, however, is the degree to which it would be possible to
separate the objective source data, which Mason used to form its subjective and interpretive pictorial representations, from the pictorial representations themselves. If use of the source data necessarily implicates
Mason's interpretive contributions, then the particular strain of the

144. There appears, however, to be precedent for this proposition that an interpretation of a
set of facts is no more copyrightable than the facts themselves. See Hoehling v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cit. 1980) (propounding a theory regarding the cause of the
destruction of the Hindenburg). Although the late Professor Nimmer appears to concur in this
view, he points out that the "Supreme Court [in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)] took note of the unsettled nature of authority in this area, but expressly declined to resolve the issue." I NIMMER & NIMMER. supra note 44, § 2.11 [E], at 2-168.
For a view supporting copyrightability of factual interpretations, see Ginsburg, supra note 27, at
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
647.
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Merger Doctrine invoked by the court here 14 5 would render Mason's
pictorial representation not protectible by copyright.
Given the difficulty, typified in Mason, that courts encounter in
making idea/expression demarcations, a valuable service would be rendered in providing guidelines for this purpose. However, it is possible
that the most useful guidance available to courts is found in Rosenthal:
The guiding consideration in drawing the [idea/expression] line is the
preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected
in the patent and copyright laws. What is basically at stake is the extent
of the copyright owner's monopoly-from how large an area of activity
did Congress intend to allow the copyright owner to exclude others?1 4 6
As the quoted passage suggests, preservation of the appropriate balance
between competition and protection may operate as a guideline in
drawing idea/expression demarcations. Nevertheless, the desire to provide incentives to authors must also be a consideration. Specifically, if
the idea/expression line is drawn precisely, copyright will be unavailing
as a mechanism to secure for authors commercial value of their works,
and an important incentive for the creation of those works will be
removed.' 4 7
Returning in conclusion to Kregos, the Second Circuit's reversal of
the district court's summary judgment that Kregos' compilation was
not copyrightable did not, of course, signal victory for George Kregos.
In packaging the case for remand to the district court, the Second Circuit admonished that
[i]f Kregos prevails at trial on the factual issues of originality and creativity, he will be entitled to protection only against infringement of the
protectable [sic] features of his form. Only the selection of statistics
might be entitled to protection ...
Even as to the selection of statistics, if Kregos establishes entitlement to protection, he will prevail only against other forms that can be
said to copy his selection. 4 8

145. See supra note 3. An alternative, and arguably more common, statement of the
Merger Doctrine requires that when an idea is susceptible of only one expression, that expression
is not copyrightable, otherwise the copyright would result in a monopoly of the idea itself. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984); Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 44,
§ 13.03[A], at nn.44-45.
146. Rosenthal, 446 F.2d at 742.
147. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865 (1990) for a thorough treatment of the
part copyright incentives play in the creation of informational works, including compilations.
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The Second Circuit opined that the Associated Press' ("AP")
1984 form, because it was "'identical in virtually every sense to
[Kregos'] form,'" would appear to constitute an infringing work. 1 9
The Second Circuit was less certain about The AP's 1986 form, which
contained six of the nine items in Kregos' compilation, but also offered
four statistical items not provided by Kregos. 15 ° Although commonality
of six of nine statistical items might, at least on its face, render The
AP's 1986 form substantially similar to Kregos' compilation and therefore an infringement of it, the Second Circuit issued this curiously ominous portent of Kregos' likelihood of success against The AP's 1986
form:
The reason for doubting that the AP's 1986 form infringes Kregos'
form arises from the same consideration that supports Kregos' claim to a
copyright. Kregos can obtain a copyright by displaying the requisite creativity in his selection of statistics. But if someone else displays the requisite creativity by making a selection that differs in more than a trivial
degree, Kregos cannot complain. Kregos contends that the AP's 1986
form makes insignificant changes from its 1984 form. But Kregos cannot
have it both ways. If his decision to select, in the category of performance against the opposing team, statistics for the pitcher's current season
at the site of today's game displays, in combination with his other selections, enough creativity to merit copyright protection, then a competitor's
decision to select in that same category performance statistics for the
pitcher's season performance both home and away may well insulate the
competitor from a claim of infringement. Thus, though issues remain to
be explored before any determination can be made, it may well be that
Kregos will have a valid claim only as to the AP's 1984 form."'
One can only wonder why the Second Circuit had doubts that taking six of nine items from Kregos' compilation would not constitute
infringement,15 2 or why any creativity attributable to The AP's 1986
1 53
form would absolve The AP of liability for copyright infringement.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
152. All that is required for a finding of infringement is that the accused work have reproduced, with substantial similarity, a portion of the original work that is qualitatively significant to
that work. Lotus Dev. Corp., v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 51 (D. Mass. 1990).
153. Professor Goldstein provides a more accurate version of the manner in which copyright
law operates in this regard.
It is axiomatic that a defendant's liability for copyright infringement turns on how
much he has copied from plaintiff's work and not on how much original, uncopied expression he has contributed himself. Courts have followed this rule in cases where the defendant included a few lines copied verbatim from plaintiff's work in his own much longer
work, and in cases in which defendant did not copy verbatim but rather dipped beneath the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
surface of plaintiff's work to borrow protected narrative, incident or characterization, and
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In spite of the Second Circuit's closing remarks, George Kregos might,
with a whistle in the wind, expect the district court to recognize applicable notions of substantial similarity in determining whether either or
both The AP's 1984 and 1986 forms result in infringement.
C.

Substantial Similarity

Having obtained a measure of the scope of copyright protection in
a compilation of data and having determined what, if anything, remains after an Idea/Expression Merger analysis, copyright infringement analysis requires a court to determine whether an accused work is
substantially similar16 4 to the protectible expression embodied in the
copyrighted work.
then embellished these with his own original expression. The rule in both types of cases is
that liability will turn on what the defendant has taken and not on what he has added.
Behind the rule is the familiar principle that copyright protects from unauthorized copying
each and every protectible element of an author's original expression-no more and no less.
II GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, § 7.3.1. (footnotes omitted). See also Warner Bros. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). "If a defendant copies a substantial portion of
plaintiff's sequence of events, he does not escape infringement by adding original episodes somewhere along the line." Id. at 241.
It seems possible that because of the additional statistical items provided by, and included in
The AP's 1986 form, that form might qualify for copyright protection. However, they would also
undoubtedly assume the status of derivative works.
Something of a gloss has been imparted to the statutory definition of "derivative work" so
that, at least in some circuits, a work is considered a derivative work "only if it would be considered an infringing work if the material which it has derived from a prior work had been taken
with the consent of a copyright proprietor of such prior work." Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d
1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976)). In any
event, the right to create derivative works based on his copyrighted work is one of the exclusive
rights bestowed on a copyright owner under the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
Therefore, creation of an unauthorized derivative work is an act of copyright infringement. Because of this, The AP's ability to enforce a purported copyright in its 1986 form is problematic.
See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 44, § 3.06, at 3-22.2 to 3-23.
154. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER. supra note 44, § 13.03[A], at 13-23.
Just as copying is an essential element of copyright infringement, so substantial similarity
between the plaintiff's and defendant's works is an essential element of actionable copying.
Yet, the determination of the extent of similarity which will constitute a substantial and
hence infringing similarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and
one which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations. . . It is clear that slight or
trivial similarities are not substantial and are therefore non-infringing. But it is equally
clear that two works may not be literally identical and yet, for purposes of copyright infringement, may be found to be substantially similar. Id.
It should be noted that the concept of similarity serves dual purposes in copyright infringement
analysis. (The "similarity" contemplated here is that between the copyrighted work and the accused work.) The degree of similarity is relevant in determining whether the accused infringer
copied from the copyrighted work, and it is relevant in determining whether the accused infringer's taking was of a kind and a degree to constitute infringement.
Decisions sometimes confuse the different uses to which similarity can be put in proof
of infringement-specifically, the use of similarity to prove copying and the use of similarity to prove improper appropriation. In an important study discovered after his death in
Published1984,
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Prospective infringers and other second comers who find themselves poised to use portions of a copyrighted work are able to rely on
the concept of substantial similarity 55 as a yardstick to modulate the
nature and amount of data they may take from the copyrighted work
with impunity.
A copyright plaintiff's burden to establish substantial similarity as
an element of his claim of infringement effectively permits others any
use of the copyrighted work that does not result in a second work that
is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. Consequently, it is apparent that the requirement of substantial similarity undercuts the argument that providing copyright protection for a compilation of facts
provides the copyright owner a monopoly with respect to those facts.
Professor Denicola anticipated and persuasively disposed of the
"monopoly" argument:

distinguished from similarities probative of improper appropriation. Unlike the similarity
required to prove improper appropriation, similarities probative of copying need not lie in
copyrighted expression; an unprotected element appearing in both the copyrighted work
and the defendant's work may itself indicate that the defendant copied.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 83, § 7.2.1.2 (Supp. 1991).
Professor Latman proposed that courts apply the term "probative similarity," rather than
"substantial similarity," to the similarity required to prove copying.
A similarity, which may or may not be substantial, is probative of copying if, by definition,
it is one that under all the circumstances justifies an inference of copying. In order to
emphasize the function of such similarity and avoid the confusion of double usage, this
Article suggests use of the term 'probative similarity' in place of 'substantial similarity' in
this context.
Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 101, 103 (1990). This section is indifferent to issues
probative of the physical act of copying, but addresses whether the similarity of an accused work
to a copyrighted work is sufficient to vest the copyright owner with an actionable claim of
infringement.
155. In fact, copyright infringement analysis invokes a prerequisite threshold inquiry, sometimes referred to as the "de minimis" test. See, e.g., G. R. Leonard & Co. v. Stack, 386 F.2d 38
(7th Cir. 1967). See also, 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 44, § 13.03[A], n.101 and cases cited
therein. According to the de minimis test, an accused infringer is permitted to copy an amount of
the copyrighted work, so long as the amount copied is, quantitatively and qualitatively, an insignificant portion of the copied work.
Accordingly, at trial, Feist suggested that the measure of its copying from RTSC's directory
was limited to four fictitious listings from RTSC's total of approximately 7,700 listings. Feist
argued that the suggested amount of copying was de minimis and, therefore, not actionable.
Copyright law does indeed recognize that, in order to constitute infringement, an accused work
must contain copied material that represents "a material and substantial portion [of the copyrighted work.]" Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966). Consequently, had Feist persuaded the District Court that 4 of 7,700 was an appropriate
measure of its taking, Feist presumably would have been entitled to a judgment in its favor on the
claim of copyright infringement. Similarly, others who find it necessary or expedient to copy limited amounts from compilations or other fact-based works will have the benefit of the de minimis
test that requires the copyright owner to suffer the literal copying of a small and usually insignificant portion of his copyrighted work. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Recognizing a property interest in the collection of information contained in a copyrighted compilation need not raise the specter of the monopolist stifling future intellectual. activity. Unfettered access to individual facts would continue to be assured by the traditional requirement of
substantial similarity. Since it is the collection as a whole that represents the original work of authorship, only copying sufficient to produce a
substantially similar collection would generate potential liability.' 56
Professor Denicola has noted:
It is impossible to dictate in advance the extent of an appropriation of
information necessary to justify a finding of infringement. Presumably a
less appropriation of data would suffice when additional aspects of the
work have also been taken, since the substantial similarity test measures
cumulative effect. The question of degree is troublesome, but no more so
than in other contexts
in which judge or jury confront the issue of sub57
stantial similarity.1
In any case, to the extent that copyright derives from an original selection of data included in a compilation, mere rearrangement of that
data should present no impediment to a finding of substantial similarity. Even if the data is rearranged, an accused work may be found to
have misappropriated a substantial portion of the protectible expression
of the copyrighted work, insofar as that expression flows from the selection of data in the original. The converse of copyright is found to derive
from the arrangementof data in a compilation. It is apparent, however,
that decisions regarding substantial similarity must be and are made on
a case-by-case basis.
Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc.158 suggests a number of ways in which substantial similarity
analysis assumes idiosyncratic variations when applied to works of compilation. Key Publicationsinvolved a copyright asserted in the 1989-90
Chinese Business Guide & Directory (the "Key Directory"), a yellow
pages directory published for New York City's Chinese-American
community.
The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of copyrightability because Ms. Wang, Key Publications' president, had, in assembling the
directory, selected, from a multitude of businesses in New York and
elsewhere, 159 those of greatest interest to her audience-the New York

156. Denicola, supra note 57, at 531.
157. Id. at 532.
158. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991). Key Publications is an appeal taken from a judgment of
the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, holding that the "Galore
Directory" had infringed Key's copyright.
159. In addition to its inclusion of listings from businesses in New York's Chinatown, the
Published
by eCommons,
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City Chinese-American community. 1 0 According to the Second Circuit, the nature of the selection required for copyright "implies the exercise of judgment in choosing which facts from a given body of data to
include in a compilation." 16' 1 This Ms. Wang had done with satisfying
originality when "she excluded from the directory those businesses she
162
did not think would remain open very long."
In addition, Ms. Wang had engaged in original arrangement by
allocating the over 9000 listings she had selected to 260 different categories. 6 3 Although the Second Circuit viewed the "format of the Key
Directory [to be] common to most classified directories," and recognized that "particular categories [of the Key Directory had], of course,
been used in other classified directories," it left Key's copyright intact,
on the basis that "some of the [Key Directory] categories are of particular interest to the Chinese-American community and not common to
yellow pages, e.g., 'BEAN CURD & BEAD SPROUT SHOPS.' "164
Finally, the Second Circuit believed that "[t]he arrangement [of the
Key Directory] is in no sense mechanical, but involved creativity on the
part of Ms. Wang in deciding which categories to include and under
what name. . . .This task entailed the de minimis thought needed to
withstand the originality requirement." ' 5
Having thus established the basis of the copyrightability of the
Key Directory, and, thereby, the contours of a substantial-similarity
analysis, the Second Circuit turned to the issue of infringement. The
Second Circuit indicated that "[a]lthough the test for infringement of
original works and compilations is one of 'substantial similarity,'16 6 the
appropriate inquiry is narrowed in the case of a compilation ...
What must be shown is substantial similarity between those elements,
and only those elements, that provide copyrightability to the allegedly

tan area, Boston and Philadelphia. Id. at 513. The "selection" of the geographic areas to be
included in the directory is, therefore, similar to the geographic selection pointed to by the 1 th
Circuit. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Co. v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, 933 F.2d 952 (11 th
Cir. 1991).
160. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 513.
161. Id.
162. Id. Among the businesses excluded were certain Chinese insurance brokers, take-out
restaurants, and traditional Chinese medical practitioners. Id.
163. Id. at 514. The Second Circuit here characterized "arrangement" as referring to "the
ordering or grouping of data into lists or categories that go beyond the mere mechanical grouping
of data as such [sic], for example, the alphabetical, chronological, or sequential listings of data."
Id. at 513 (quoting Copyright Office, Guidelinesfor Registration of Fact-Based Compilations I
(Rev. Oct. 11, 1989)).
164. Id.
165. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
166. Id., (citing Business Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 402
(2d Cir. 1989); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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infringed compilation." 1 7 The Second Circuit noted that copyright protection for compilations, if not appropriately circumscribed, can operate to thwart the underlying goals of copyright protection168 by precluding competitors from using elements in the public domain. On this
basis, the Second Circuit surmised that "one might interpret Feist to
permit a finding of infringement only when a subsequent compiler produces an exact replica of a copyrighted compilation." 1 69 Nevertheless,
it proffered the metaphorical assurance to compilation copyright owners that "[w]hile, as the Court pointed out in Feist, the 'copyright in
factual compilations is thin,' we do not believe it is anorexic."' 70
The Second Circuit correctly recognized that copyrightability, and
hence infringement, might arise separately and independently from the
disparate aspects of a work of compilation:
Our discussion of the copyrightability of the 1989-90 Key Directory
thus provides the framework for our analysis of the claim of infringement. The elements that afford copyrightability to the 1989-90 Key Directory are, first, the arrangement of over 260 categories under which
businesses are catalogued and, second, the selection of the 9000 businesses so categorized. If the Galore Directory is substantially similar to
the 1989-90 Key Directory with regard to that arrangement of categories
or that selection of businesses, then a finding of infringement. can be supDirectory has merely appropriated
ported. If it is not, then the Galore
7
elements in the public domain.'

1

Addressing first the respective arrangements of the two directories
into business categories, the Second Circuit concluded that the two directories were not even remotely similar. The Galore directory conwere considtained only twenty-eight categories, only three of which
1 72
ered duplicative of categories in the Key Directory.
Addressing next the degree of similarity between the selection of
business listings included in the two directories, the Second Circuit

167. Id. (citing Kregos v. The Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1991)).
168. The Supreme Court has indicated that "[tihe primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts.'"
Feist, Ill S. Ct. at 1290 (citing U.S. CoNsT., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
169. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 514.
170. Id. Perhaps this aphorism will encourage George Kregos on reprise of his claim against
The Associated Press before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
171. Id. at 515.
172. Id. The Second Circuit did not indicate the degree of similarity between the
descriptors corresponding to the remaining 25 Galore categories and the descriptors corresponding
must be similar of the respective Key Directory categories. That is, if the two directories used very
similar, but not literally identical descriptors, should they not be considered the same for the
purposes of the substantial similarity analysis. Accordingly, the Second Circuit was not required
to decide whether Galore's copying of 28 categories from Key's 260 would render the arrangement
Published
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noted that 1500 of Galore's 2000 listings had been copied from the
9000 listings in the Key Directory. However, this was not a sufficient
nexus to render the two directories substantially similar for infringement purposes.1 73
The gravamen of the Second Circuit's ratiocination, culminating
in a finding of noninfringement, appears to be the Second Circuit's enigmatic proposition that "[t]he key issue is not whether there is overlap
or copying but whether the organizingprinciple guiding the selection of
businesses for the two publications is in fact substantially similar."17' 4
Accordingly, the Second Circuit would maintain that the copyright in a
compilation, even -though it results from an original selection of data,
must countenance the taking of a substantial subset of that data, if it is
taken for a different purpose, that is, according to a different selection
criteria.
In a somewhat maladroit explication of the newly-announced "criterion-of-selection" rule, the Second Circuit suggested that had "Galore . . . exactly duplicated a substantial designated portion of the
1989-90 Key Directory-for example, all its listings of professionals
such as medical doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers and architects,
an infringement action would succeed." 7 ' The cogency of the Second
Circuit's supposition is suspect because of the improbability that such a
selection itself could be copyrightable, and therefore susceptible of infringement. 76 What the Second Circuit seems to mean, but does not
make explicit, is that, insofar as the copyright owner's selection criteria
subsumes the selection criteria attributed to the accused infringer, the
accused infringer will nonetheless stand liable for his appropriation,
even though he did not appropriate the entire copyrighted compilation.

173. Id. The Second Circuit makes mention that Galore had not taken 7500 listings for the
Key Directory and that it had added 500 listings to its directory that did not appear in the Key
directory. This notation would seem to be irrelevant in view of the relatively settled propositions
that (i) infringement is measured by what is taken from t he copyrighted work, not by what remains undisturbed, and (ii) that adding additional material to an infringing work will not excuse
the infringement. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
174. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 516 (emphasis added). It is difficult to divine precisely
what the Second Circuit means here, inasmuch as there is no articulation in its opinion of the
"organizing principle" of either directory, much less the differences between them.
175. Id. at 517.
176. Earlier in its opinion, the Second Circuit had correctly appraised the copyright value of
such a selection when it supposed that "[t]he arrangement of categories in a classified directory is
to be distinguished from the placement of a listing in a particular category. Placing listings within
categories is the sort of mechanical task that does not merit copyright protection." Id. at 515.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's reliance on Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859
(2d Cir. 1984), appears to be valid. Key Publications,945 at 516. However, the 5000 "premium"
cards in Eckes arguably constituted an original selection in the sense required by Feist, inasmuch
as the selection was the product of the compilation author's judgment.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/14
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Needless to say, it should be interesting to see whether this rule is
adopted in other jurisdictions and, if so, the manner in which it plays.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Feist itself did not inform directly on the law of copyright infringement. However, its imposition of the element of creativity into
the standard of copyrightability will require courts to scrutinize all
works, including works of compilation, to determine whether they exhibit the requisite creativity. Copyright infringement analysis will necessarily reflect the notion that the scope of copyright in a compilation is
measured by that which is creative in the selection, arrangement, or
coordination of the compilation. Furthermore, although there may be
conflicting views whether Idea/Expression Merger analysis is a component of a copyright infringement determination, rather than of a
copyrightability determination, it is clear that Idea/Expression Merger
analysis will have a significant role to play in copyright infringement
litigations involving works of compilation. The factual, and often functional, nature of compilations can be expected to complicate this analytical process. Even with a grasp on the scope of the copyright in a
compilation, the method by which substantial similarity is evaluated
may exhibit ramifications unique to works of compilation.
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